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JOHN BRAITHWAITE AND RAY NICKSON*
I. THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs),' particularly since the
influence of Desmond Tutu's South African Commission,2 are increasingly
used to discover and reveal past wrongdoings following armed conflicts. 3
They are often established with a requirement to report within two or three
years.4 A problem with such speedy reporting is that the most traumatized
* John Braithwaite is an Australian Research Council Federation Fellow, Australian
National University. This article is a revised version of his Schwartz Lecture on Dispute
Resolution, delivered at the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law on April 5,
2011. Ray Nickson is a Ph.D. candidate at the Australian National University.
1 See the discussion of the many forms TRCs can take in ELIZABETH STANLEY,
TORTURE, TRUTH AND JUSTICE: THE CASE OF TIMOR-LESTE (2009).
2 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was based upon the
Promotion of National Reconciliation and Unity Act, No. 34 (1995) (S.Afr.). The TRC's
mission, as explained more fully in the Act's long title, was "[t]o provide for the
investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature,
causes and extent of gross violations of human rights committed during the period from 1
march 1960..." Id. Much has been written regarding the South African TRC. See
generally Elizabeth Stanley, Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 39 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 525 (2001); Paul van Zyl, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case
of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 52 COLUM. J. INT'L AFF. 647
(1999); Martha Minnow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 14 NEGOTIATION J. 319 (1998); Jennifer J. Llewellyn &
Robert Howse, Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 355 (1999); James L. Gibson, Does
Truth Lead to Reconciliation? Testing the Causal Assumptions of the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Process, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 201 (2004); Anurima Bhargava, Defining
Political Crimes: A Case Study of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1304 (2002).
3 Truth commissions may be defined simply as "bodies set up to investigate a past
history of violations of human rights in a particular country." Priscilla Hayner, Fifieen
Truth Commissions 1974-1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HuM. RTs. Q. 597, 600 (1994).
According to Hayner, there are four distinguishing features of Truth Commissions, that
they: (1) focus on the past; (2) attempt to "paint the overall picture" rather than focus on
specific events; (3) are usually temporary institutions whose work finishes upon
submission of a final report; and (4) are vested witl authority. Id. at 604.
4 The most recent commission, the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation
Commission was required to report in one year, extendable to two. See JOHN
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victims often take longest to be ready to participate in transitional justice.5
The experience of the civil war in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, also
demonstrates that it often takes many years of traditional reconciliation work
before perpetrators of the worst atrocities acquire the confidence that they
can confess their crimes without fear of revenge. 6 It will be explained in this
lecture that collective confessions (by military units) often preceded
individual confessions of war crimes. So how should we think about the
sequencing of truth, justice, and reconciliation after war? The lecture makes a
case for Truth and Reconciliation Commissions that are permanent
institutions,7 keeping their doors open to assist with truth, reconciliation, and
justice at whatever point in time victims and perpetrators are emotionally
ready. By the time all of the survivors have died, the TRC may function as no
more than a museum that stores their testimony and the artifacts of suffering,
transmitting memories of tyranny and reconciliation to the next generation.
II. FALSE STARTS ON THE SEQUENCING OF
TRUTH, JUSTICE, AND RECONCILIATION
On the strength of South African data on truth and reconciliation,
especially the work of James Gibson,8 Braithwaite published the model of
BRAITHWAITE ET AL., PILLARS AND SHADOWS: STATEBUILDING AS PEACEBUILDING IN
SOLOMON IsLANDS 86-91 (2010). Hayner states that a defining feature of truth
commissions are their temporary nature, usually being required to operate in a "pre-
defined period of time." Hayner, supra note 3, at 604.
5 This is a general issue with all forms of restorative justice and therapeutic
jurisprudence. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE
REGULATION 45-53 (2002).
6 JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., RECONCILIATION AND ARCHITECTURES OF
COMMITMENT: SEQUENCING PEACE IN BOUGAINVILLE (2010).
7 This argument should be distinguished from that of Scharf, who argues in favor of
a permanent international truth commission, as an adjunct to the permanent international
criminal court. Scharf's arguments in favor of a permanent international truth
commission are that there would be: "(1) superior sufficiency in funding; (2) a greater
perception of neutrality; (3) less susceptibility to domestic influences; and (4) greater
speed in launching investigations." Michael P. Scharf, The Case for a Permanent
International Truth Commission, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375, 380 (1997).
8 JAMES L. GIBsoN, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A DIVIDED
NATION? (2004).
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high-integrity truth-seeking and reconciliation in Figure 1.9 Not one of the
first twelve cases of armed conflicts so far completed in our comparative
study, PEACEBUILDING COMPARED,' 0 fits this model. Zero out of twelve is a
discouraging hit rate for a social theorist interested in elaborating starting
models iteratively from new data. In this lecture, we consider the case that
approaches closest to fitting the model of Figure 1, the Bougainville Civil
War." Yet, because both sides in Bougainville enjoyed total immunity from
prosecution,12 there is really no bottom loop to Figure 1.
9 John Braithwaite, Between Proportionality and Impunity: Confrontation Truth
Prevention: The American Society of Criminology 2004 Sutherland Address, 43
CRIMINOLOGY 283 (2005).
10 See generally PEACEBUELDING COMPARED, http://peacebuilding.anu.edu.
11 The Bougainville Civil War is also often referred to as "the Bougainville Crisis."
Eugene Ogan, The Cultural Background to the Bougainville Crisis, 92-93 JOURNAL DE
LA SOCItTE DES OctANISTES 61 (1991). Regan states that there are three dominant
perspectives about the causes of the Bougainville Civil War: (1) ethnonationalist
demands as a result of grievances towards the Panguna mine; (2) cultural perspectives
that focus on the impact of the mine and economic inequalities that resulted from it; and
(3) the role of class conflict. Anthony J. Regan, Causes and Course of the Bougainville
Conflict, 33 J. PAC. HIST. 269, 269 (1998). These various perspectives are best
exemplified by three scholarly works. First, James Griffin discusses the war from an
ethnonationalist perspective. James Griffin, Bougainville is a Special Case, in THE
BOUGAINVILLE CRISIS 1 (R.J. May & Matthew Spriggs eds., 1990) Second, Filer argues
that social disintegration as a result of the mining operation is responsible. Colin Filer
The Bougainville Rebellion, the Mining Industry and the Process of Social Disintegration
in Papua New Guinea, in THE BOUGAINVILLE CRISIS 73 (R.J. May & Matthew Spriggs
eds., 1990). Finally, Wesley-Smith and Ogan believe that modes and relations of
production best explain the causes of the Bougainville civil war. Terence Wesley-Smith
& Eugene Ogan, Copper, Class and Crisis: Changing Relations of Production in
Bougainville, 4 CONTEMP. PACIFIc 245 (1992).
12 This immunity was an entrenched feature of the various agreements that sought to
establish peace. See Bougainville Peace Agreement, Papua New Guinea-Bougainville, cl.
331, Aug. 30, 2001, http://ips.cap.a
nu.edu.au/ssgm/resourcedocuments/bougainville/PDF/BougainvillePeaceAgreement29A
ug01.pdf (provided amnesty for "all persons involved in crisis-related activities" and
pardons for those convicted of crisis-related activities). See also Lincoln Agreement on
Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville cl. 10, Jan. 23, 1998,
http://ips.cap.anu.edu.aulssgm/resourcedocuments/bougainville/PDF/incoln-
agreement.pdf.
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While it is still early in the data collection process for PEACEBUILDING
COMPARED, my revised suspicion already is that truth, justice, and
reconciliation can come in all possible sequences.' 3 There may be no best,
right, or even a most common sequence.14 When it is mostly reconciliation
that comes first, as we will illustrate with the armed conflicts in Bougainville
and Indonesia, it is possible for reconciliation to be done in a way that either
helps or hinders future truthseeking and justice. When it is justice that mostly
comes first, as we will discuss with the case of Solomon Islands, it is
possible for justice to be done in a way that lays a foundation for subsequent
truth and reconciliation, and it is possible for it to be done in a way that
makes future truth and reconciliation more difficult. So far in
PEACEBUILDING COMPARED we have not studied any Truth Commission
cases that are not Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. 15 When we do
study cases where it is mostly truth that is secured first, our interest has now
become to discover the ways that truth might lay a foundation for justice and
reconciliation, or might be an impediment to them. We now proceed to flesh
out these issues by considering in turn the armed conflicts around Australia,
what Australian strategic studies scholars sometimes call its "arc of
instability,"' 6 in Bougainville, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and Solomon Islands.
13 For one of the most important contributions on timing in transitional justice, see
Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein with Jamie Rowen, Context, Timing and the
Dynamics of Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective, 31 HUM. RTs. Q. 163 (2009).
Also, on the sequencing of trials, amnesties, and truth commissions, see Tricia D. Olsen
et al., The Justice Balance: When Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and
Democracy, 32 HuM. RTS. Q. 980 (2010).
14 For example, Geoffrey Robertson suggests that Truth Commissions can occur
before trials, "to verify the need for a court," or after trials to build upon their work.
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 313 (3d ed., Penguin Group 2008) (1999) (regarding the
interplay between Truth Commissions and trials). Nevertheless, he believes that both
truth and justice can operate in tandem. Id.
15 A Truth Commission that is not a Truth and Reconciliation Commission gives
reduced priority to relational justice, to reconciliation, and reintegration values such as
healing.
16 This "arc of instability" has been defined by Duncan and Chand as "a wide arc of
countries to Australia's north and north-east-including Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu." Ron Duncan & Satish Chand, The
Economics of the 'Arc of Instability', 16 ASIAN-PAC. EcoN. LITERATURE 1 (2002); see
also Robert Ayson, The 'Arc of Instability' and Australia's Strategic Policy, 61 AUSTL. J.
INT'L AFF. 215 (2007); John Connell, Saving the Solomon Islands: A New Geopolitics in
the 'Arc of Instability', 44 GEOGRAPHY RES. 111; Kim Beazley, Arc of Instability, 57
NAT'L OBSERVER 17 (2003).
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This region has been the initial focus of PEACEBUILDING COMPARED; it is
now moving on to work in South Asia, Central Asia, and Africa.
III. MOSTLY RECONCILIATION FIRST IN BOUGAINVILLE,
FOLLOWED BY LOCAL TRUTH AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Bougainville suffered a terrible civil war for a decade from 1988 that
pitted separatist forces of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)
against the natiotial military and police of Papua New Guinea.1 7 The fighting
evolved to pit Bougainville factions against each other in the worst killing.' 8
The PEACEBUILDING COMPARED book on the Bougainville Civil War argues
that peace in Bougainville was shaped by bottom-up traditional and Christian
reconciliation practices and a carefully crafted top-down political
settlement.19 These two processes operated in symbiotic fashion, each
making space for, and reinforcing, the other. For the student of
peacebuilding, there is much to learn from the genius of this symbiosis
between a top-down architecture of credible commitment and bottom-up
reconciliation. 20
The Bougainville peace has progressively become more resilient since
1998. The sequential sustaining of the peace has been patient, what Volker
Boege has called a "slow food" approach to peacebuilding. 21 One wave of
bottom-up reconciliation 22 built on previous waves, expanding the
17 Regan, supra note 11, at 277.
18 Peter Reddy, Reconciliation in Bougainville: Civil War Peacekeeping and
Restorative Justice, 11 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 117, 119 (2008); Regan, supra note 11, at
279.
19 JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 6.
2 0 See ANTHONY J. REGAN, LIGHT INTERVENTION: LESSONS FROM BOUGAINVILLE
(2010).
21 Volker Boege, Bougainville and the Discovery of Slowness: An Unhurried
Approach to State-Building in the Pacific, 3 AusTL. CENTRE FOR PEACE & CONFLICT
STUD. OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES (2006).
22 See Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional
Justice from the Bottom Up, 35 J. L. Soc'Y 265, 279-283 (2008) (for more discussion on
bottom up transitional justice approaches, of which reconciliation mechanisms are a part).
As a contrast between bottom-up and top-down approaches, Adwan and Bar-On
distinguish peacebuilding from peacemaking based on these approaches: "peace building
is a planned activity, based on bottom-up processes, while peacemaking is a political
agreement based on top-down processes." Sami Adwan & Dan Bar-On, Shared History
Project: A PRIME Example of Peacebuilding under Fire, 17 INT'L J. POL. CULTURE SOC.
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geographical scope of the peace, and the breadth and depth of forgiveness
across the society. The architecture of the top-down peace settlement has also
been sequenced, with linkages that require one side to meet a commitment,
such as surrendering weapons before the other side will deliver their next
undertaking in an agreed sequence. 23 In this architecture, international
peacekeepers played a significant role in securing the credible
commitments. 24 While peacekeepers were rarely hands-on mediators of the
indigenous reconciliation, one of their greatest contributions was to initiate
conversations between local enemies who were afraid of each other, allowing
initial meetings to occur under the peacekeepers' security umbrella.25
Bougainville never had a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.26 All
Bougainville combatants enjoyed complete amnesty, 27 though a few non-
Bougainvillean members of the Papua New Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF)
were convicted for human rights abuses during the war in Port Moresby.
Local reconciliation efforts began early during the war itself, gathered
momentum throughout the 1990s, and continue in 2011.28 There has long
been recognition in Bougainville that reconciliation takes decades rather than
years. Some reconciliation processes over intertribal fighting caused by
World War II continued into the 1980s.29
513 (2004); Jim Rolfe, Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville, 8 INT'L.
PEACEKEEPING 38 (2001).
23 Anthony J. Regan, The Bougainville Intervention: Political Legitimacy and
Sustainable Peace Building, in INTERVENTION AND STATE-BUILDING IN THE PACIFIC 184,
189-205 (Greg Fry & Tarcisius Tara Kabutalulaka eds., 2008); REGAN, supra note 20;
Edward P. Wolfers, Bougainville Autonomy--Implications for Governance and
Decentralization, 5 AuSTL. CENTRE FOR PEACEKEEPING & CONFLICT STUD. OCCASIONAL
PAPER SERIES (2006); Anthony J. Regan, Sustainability of International Peace-Building
Interventions-The Bougainville Experience, 1997-2006, in INTERVENTION AND STATE-
BUILDING IN THE PACIFIC (Greg Fry & Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka eds., 2008).
24 BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 6, at 1.
25 For further discussion of peacekeepers' role in Bougainville, see Reddy, supra
note 18; Rolfe, supra note 22; Stefan Knollmayer, A 'Share House Magnified': Civilian
Integration with the Truce and Peace Monitoring Groups on Bougainville, 39 J. PAC.
HIST. 221 (2004).
26 BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 6, at 133, 137-39.
27 Bougainville Peace Agreement, supra note 12.
28 The centrality of "reconciliation" to the peace process in Bougainville is well
established. See Reddy, supra note 18, at 119; Rolfe, supra note 22, at 38.
29 PETER LONDEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S WARS: A HISTORY OF AUSTRALIAN
PEACEKEEPING (2004); Hank Nelson, Bougainville in World War II, in BOUGAINVILLE
BEFORE THE CONFLICT 196 (Anthony J. Regan & Helga M. Griffin eds., 2005).
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Every village-level story of reconciliation was unique. The village in
Selau where John Braithwaite lived in 1969 had been the base of C Company
of the BRA. Starting in 1990, when the war became chaotic, voices in the
village began to be raised in favor of neutrality. 30 Women from across Selau
organised a peace march followed by an all-night vigil for peace that it is
claimed 5,000 attended-most of the population of Selau.31 The war had
opened up some old internal divisions. There were allegations that the local
BRA commander had used his position to murder a man who was much
disapproved because he used sorcery against adversaries. 32 He was also
feared and reviled by many because he had married his own daughter. In
turn, there were allegations that the combat death of that local BRA
commander was "friendly fire," which was in fact "unfriendly fire" from
loyal kin of the murdered sorcerer within C Company. Others dispute this.
Reconciliation within the area and, between the PNGDF and the village, was
accomplished in August 1991 after the women seized the peacemaking
agenda with the council of chiefs and the village declared itself neutral.33
Both the villagers and the PNGDF officers who attended the
reconciliation ceremony remember it as moving and a turning point towards
local peace. 34 It was a peace that created what Mary Kaldor calls an "island
of civility"35-a peace zone-in the Selau region, which demonstrated the
advantages of peaceful neutrality to those living in adjacent conflict areas, in
a similar way to some other peace zones in Bougainville. 36 The BRA
30 This section of the text is heavily based upon BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 6,
at 67-68.
31 Paul van Tongeren et al., Women Weaving Bougainville Together: Leitana Nehan
Womens Development Agency in Papua New Guinea, in PEOPLE BUILDING PEACE 11:
SUCCESSFUL STORIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY 122, 124 (Paul van Tongeran et al. eds., 2005).
32 For a discussion of the role of sorcery in Melanesian societies, see Mary
Patterson, Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia 45 OCEANIA 132 (1974). Patterson
concludes that sorcery has the capacity to both resolve and increase conflict. Id. at 160.
33 Ruth V. Saovana-Spriggs, Gender and Peace: Bougainvillean Women, Matriliny,
and the Peace Process, PhD (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National
University) (on file with Menzies Library, Australian National University).
34 For other, albeit brief, recollections of reconciliation ceremonies in the
Bougainville context, see Reddy, supra note 18, at 124-25.
35 MARY KALDOR, NEW AND OLD WARS: ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN A GLOBAL ERA
117 (1999).
36 Zones of peace are traditionally considered to be "designed to mitigate the
conditions of conflict for a particular geographic community or to assist in the
implementation of peace or post-conflict reconstruction." Landon E. Hancock & Pushipa
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weapons from that part of Selau were loaded onto a helicopter and Sister
Lorraine Garasu and elder Bernadette Ropa dropped them into the ocean as
part of the ceremony. This sealed the peace and weapons disposal in this
little pocket of Bougainville many years before peacekeepers arrived. Some
PNG security forces personnel who attended reconciliations such as this one
in Selau reported them as the most positive memories of the struggle, saying
that the aspect of the ceremonies that most moved them was when both the
soldiers and the villagers had the opportunity to speak about their personal
feelings of loss for loved ones who had fallen.37
The Selau region has a population of only 7,000, but the chiefs told
Braithwaite in April 2006 that they had participated in eighty-seven separate
formal reconciliations by then. While hundreds of large reconciliations have
been held across Bougainville for big groups, and thousands of smaller ones
in relation to hamlets,38 families or individuals, a widespread perspective a
decade after the war is that most of the reconciliations that are needed still
remain to be done.
Our Selau story reveals something important about reconciliation after
war. There is always a big geopolitical story of what a war is about that we
read in the newspapers. In Bougainville, it was about control of one of the
largest copper and gold mines the world has seen.39 But Selau, which was far
from the mine, was not the only locality where sorcery allegations became
Iyer, The Nature, Structure and Variety of Peace Zones, in ZONES OF PEACE 29-40
(Landon E. Hancock & Christopher Mitchell eds., 2007); see generally ZONES OF PEACE
(Landon E. Hancock & Christopher Mitchell eds., 2007). Specifically regarding the peace
zone way of thinking about Bougainville and Somalia, see Peter Reddy, Peace Operations
and Restorative Justice: Groundwork for Post-Conflict Regeneration (2006) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University) (on file with Menzies Library,
Australian National University).
37 One of these officers said women peacemakers from Bougainville changed him as
a soldier:
I was a very aggressive traditional soldier. Very tough on people. As a result of my
experience on Bougainville, I changed. I listen to my soldiers more now. I think
negotiation is more important. [He explained how he was particularly affected by
the compassion of women with children who had lost their husbands].. .I wonder if
my own wife would react that way if it was me who was killed.' Interview with
PNGDF soldier, in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea (2007).
38 Another estimate states that by 2004, half the villages in Bougainville had
participated in reconciliation ceremonies. Reddy, supra note 18, at 127.
39 See Filer, supra note 11; Regan, supra note 11.
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the local motivator of conflict.40 Quite common was a situation where one
chief took his people on one side of the civil war in order to claim back land
and settle a score against another chief who had joined the conflict on the
other side and who was believed to have stolen their land. A war about a
faraway mine became an excuse to join a conflict over a local grievance that
cut much deeper. There were even cases in our Bougainville fieldwork of
chiefs who were believed to have committed atrocities when they fought on
the U.S. side in World War II being attacked in revenge by villages who
supported the Japanese side.41 It follows that after a civil war a national
political settlement that touches only the national political issues is not
enough. Local reconciliation dealing with those more longstanding and bitter
local grievances is also needed. Local grievances rather than big geopolitical
issues are probably more likely to light the sparks that reignite armed conflict
in village societies like Bougainville.
The peace in Bougainville has two stories. There is the story of top-down
peace ultimately negotiated under New Zealand auspices in 1997 and 1998,
and ultimately under United Nations (UN) facilitation of the political
settlement between PNG and Bougainvillean factions in 1999, 2000, and
2001.42 And there is the story of zones of local reconciliation starting soon
after the onset of war and continuing the struggle to expand its reach two
decades later. The continuation of this story into the late 2000s is well
illustrated by the large spike of reconciliations associated with the Youth
Cross (Box 1).43
40 Siwai was another prominent example. See BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 6, at
31.
41 See MAX RIMOLDI & ELEANOR RIMOLDI, HAHALI AND THE LABOUR OF LOVE: A
SOCIAL MOVEMENT ON BUKA ISLAND (1992).
42 See REGAN, supra note 20; Anthony J. Regan, The Bougainville Political
Settlement and the Prospects for Sustainable Peace, 17 PAC. ECON. BULL. 114 (2002);
Anthony J. Regan, Resolving Two Dimensions of Conflict: The Dynamics of Consent,
Consensus and Compromise, 12 CONCILIATION RESOURCES ACCORD 36 (2002), www.c-
r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/resolving.php; Anthony J. Regan, Development
and Conflict: The Struggle for Self-determination in Bougainville, in SECURITY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS: SOCIAL RESILIENCE IN EMERGING STATES, (Anne
M. Brown ed., 2007); Anthony J. Regan, Sustainability of International Peace-Building
Interventions-The Bougainville Experience 1997-2006, in INTERVENTION AND STATE-
BUILDING IN THE PACIFIC (Greg Fry & Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka eds., 2008).
43 The contents of this box are from the authors' fieldnotes from southern
Bougainville in 2007. BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 6, at 69-71.
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Box 1: The Youth Cross
One of the strengths of peacebuilding in
Bougainville is the Church. And a strength of
the international peacekeeping was that it
worked this strength by giving its three
chaplains-'The Three Amigos'-free rein to
work the churches as a central plank of its
peacebuilding strategy. It was the Church that
gave the most important base to the
peacebuilding work of the women. The Youth
Cross story is about how in the post-post-
conflict period it gave an organisational base to
youth leaders who wanted to take
reconciliation to a new level. The Youth Cross
story also shows that while the big story of
reconciliation in Bougainville is about
indigenous traditions of peacemaking, almost
as big a story is the grafting of Christian
traditions of healing onto the peace process.
World Youth Day-a huge gathering of
Catholic young people-was held in Sydney in
2008. A lead-up in 2007 was the Youth Cross
travelling to many countries of the world on its
way to Sydney. The Youth Cross came to
Papua New Guinea, but to the dismay of
Catholic youth in Bougainville, not to their
island. So the youth of Bougainville made their
own little cross, travelled to Rabaul to place it
on the Youth Cross, then placed it on their own
large wooden cross back in Bougainville.
The Catholic Youth of Bougainville (most
people in Bougainville are Catholic) decided
that the theme for the visits of the Youth Cross
would be 'peace and reconciliation'. The youth
believed they could show their elders how their
generation could take reconciliation up to a
new and more spiritual level. During my 2007
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fieldwork, I followed the Youth Cross from
Siwai into Bana District. For much of its
journey, the cross was followed by thousands
of people. Days of fasting and prayer preceded
its arrival in most villages. At that point, it was
stopping at every village for three days and we
were told that the plan was that it would stop in
every village in Bougainville. It should have
been clear that there was not time to
accomplish this before World Youth Day 2008.
Miracles occurred as the cross moved from
village to village and some who were the
subject of the miracles then became celebrities
following the cross around the island. For
example, one man, a village drunk, cursed at
the cross when it entered his village. He
instantly dropped dead. Half an hour later,
miraculously, he returned to life. While he was
dead, he saw many wonderful things, met
many long-dead ancestors and was able to
report messages from them to the crowd.
At all of the dozen villages about which I
made inquiries in south-western Bougainville,
major reconciliations in front of the cross
relating to the nine-year civil war occurred. A
Catholic priest told me that in Siwai alone, 500
separate war-related reconciliations had
occurred in front of the cross.
Some reconciliations related to killings,
rapes and other serious crimes, where the
perpetrator(s) went before the cross as it stood
in the village to ask forgiveness from the
victim or their family. Many were groups who
went before the cross asking forgiveness from
their victims. One of these involved a young
Me'ekamui fighter who had robbed a micro-
finance bank with a gun that he cut in half in
454
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front of the cross. During the robbery, shots
were fired and a stray bullet hit a young mother
with a baby. During negotiations in the days
before the cross arrived in the young man's
village, the local police sergeant gave the
young man a '100 per cent guarantee' that he
would not be prosecuted if he asked for
forgiveness from the mother in front of the
cross and changed his ways. I asked the
sergeant if anyone in the community criticised
him for not prosecuting such a serious crime.
No, he said, everyone in the community
thought it was the right thing to do and
everyone felt safer when a gang member
destroyed his gun and committed to obey the
law in a spiritually profound reconciliation like
this.
Rarely was monetary compensation paid in
the reconciliations that occurred before the
Youth Cross. The cross arrived in a village in
the late afternoon and reconciliations occurred
right through the night into the next day. It
must have been exhausting (but exhilarating
too) for the local priest. In Siwai, awe-struck
children sat closest to the cross under cover,
with the adult audience standing at the back in
the sun.
The celebrations before the cross were
theologically interesting. As a priest scowled at
me, he said that some people would have us
believe that Jesus was a waitman, when in fact
Jesus was born in Nagovis. In some villages,
when the time came for the procession of the
cross to move down the road to the next
village, those who would lift the cross from its
base announced that it was stuck. 'The cross is
stuck', reverberated around the gathering.
455
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'Someone must step forward to ask forgiveness
before the cross leaves.' And someone would
step forward, finally finding the courage to ask
for forgiveness.
This was a very different reconciliation
context than the traditional one. The short time
frame between the impending arrival of the
cross and the proposed reconciliation before
the cross gave victims little time to come to
terms with the reconciliation on big matters.
One of my neighbours in Siwai was told by a
former BRA commander as the cross was
approaching the village that he had killed her
husband and he pleaded for forgiveness before
the cross. She had no idea that this man had
killed her'husband. It was a lot to digest, yet it
was a successful reconciliation that moved the
whole community. But in other such cases the
cross moved on to the next village with the
parties still working on the healing process
through planned future reconciliation meetings.
John Paul Lederach argued that peace must be not only top-down and
bottom-up, but also middle-out.44 Bottom-up connects the grassroots to the
peacemaking projects of elites; top-down connects capacities that can be
mobilized only by national elites down to lower levels of the society. Middle-
out complements these vertical strengths with horizontal capacities to move
back and forth across social divides. Organizations in civil society that are
intermediate between the state and families/hamlets often do this middle-out
work. Yet in his more recent book, Lederach finds a web metaphor more
useful. What he calls the middle-out capacity is in fact strategic networking
that "creates a web of relationships and activities that cover the setting."45
The women of Bougainville certainly did this with peace marches that wound
44 JOHN P. LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED
SOCIETIES (1997). .
45 JOHN P. LEDERACH, THE MORAL IMAGINATION: THE ART AND SOUL OF BUILDING
PEACE 80 (2005).
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across the island, connecting new women to the network at each hamlet they
passed. 46 So did the next generation of youth with the journeys of the Youth
Cross. Lederach sees the key to weaving these webs as "getting a small set of
the right people involved at the right places. What's missing is not the critical
mass. The missing ingredient is the critical yeast."47
In Bougainville, countless local peacemakers were that yeast, many of
them women. Sufficient yeast is progressively connected to the project of
building the bread of peace and the bread rises. Lederach connects this to
Malcolm Gladwell's 48 idea from marketing in THE TIPPING POINT.
Gladwell's subtitle is "How little things make a difference." The
Bougainville peace is a classic illustration of how little peacemakers, finally
linked together, tip peacebuilding momentum to a critical mass. This
happened even as top-down peacemakers such as Theodore Miriung 49 and
John Bika50 were assassinated and even as the leaders of the war (BRA
leader Francis Ona and the PNGDF) remained spoilers of sorts,'1 and even as
profit-seeking international spoilers (the private military company Sandline
and the shadowy multinational mining interests backing them) butted in.52
Once the tipping point of bottom-up support for peace passed, progressive
elements in the BRA and in the PNG military and political elite moved
around the spoilers to join hands with the growing mass of Bougainvillean
peacemakers that had been leavened. Gradually more elements of the
ongoing spoiler faction, the Me'ekamui Defense Force, have joined in
reconciliations and joined the peace.
46 Peter Ninnes, Non-Government Organisations, Peacebuilding and Global
Networks, in NGOs AND POST CONFLICT RECOVERY: THE LEITANA NEHAN WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, BOUGAINVILLE (Helen Hakena et al. eds., 2006).
47 LEDERACH, supra note 45, at 91.
4 8 MALCOM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT (2002).
49 The Papua New Guinea Defense Force and allied guerrillas were considered
responsible following an inquiry into the October 13, 1996 assassination of Theodore
Miriung. Danial Lazare, Foot Soldiers of the New World Order: The Rise of the
Corporate Military, NEw LEFT REV., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 128, 129.
50 John Bika was murdered by masked gunmen on Sept. 12, 1989. Terence Wesley-
Smith, et al., Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2 CONTEMP. PAC., 358, 366
(1990).
51 Edward Wolfers, in a conversation with the author, accurately enough
characterized Francis Ona as more an absentee than a spoiler.
52 SEAN DORNEY, THE SANDLINE AFFAIR: POLITICS AND MERCENARIES AND THE
BOUGAINVILLE CRISIS (1998); MARY-LOUISE O'CALLAGHAN, ENEMIES WITHIN: PAPUA
NEW GUINEA, AUSTRALIA, AND THE SANDLINE CRISIS (1998).
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While reconciliation more traditional than the religious kind such as we
see with the Youth Cross is transacted in somewhat different ways in
different parts of Bougainville, there is always singing and dancing and
reciprocal gift giving by the two sides to a conflict that is intended to restore
balance and social harmony is universal. Pigs and ceremonial shell money
are mostly the gifts involved and often small amounts of cash, which are not
intended as reparation but as symbols of sorrow for the spilt blood:
To the outsider the gift may seem to be compensation (blood money).
However, to most Bougainvilleans compensation (blood money) is
repugnant. A gift is to wash away the tears; it in no way is a payment for the
loss incurred. Compensation is for gain and is equivalent to setting a value
on the life of a loved one. With a gift, one asks for forgiveness; with
compensation there is no forgiveness and the person is attempting
something which is impossible, that is putting a value on something that
cannot be bought or paid for. With our experience (Peace Foundation), we
have decided that if people want money for compensation (blood money),
then we refuse to mediate and tell them to take it to the court.. .Not only
does the blood money fail to produce reconciliation but it also leads to
further disputes and fighting. 53
In some cases, return of the bones of a person killed in the conflict is the
most important exchange. A rock may be buried or a tree planted to
symbolize permanency of the peace, the growing, restored relationships, and
a weight that is put away forever; spears, bows, and arrows may be broken.
Our interviews testified to the ethos of permanence with reconciliations,
though there were suggestions that in the south reconciliations could be less
irrevocable than in the traditions of central and northern Bougainville. The
weight of social disapproval from renouncing a reconciliation was reported
to be enormous. "The moment the hatchet is buried, it stays buried. Anyone
seen to be digging up the buried hatchet will get the most severe punishment.
This means death." 54
A long sequence of mediation meetings between dozens of chiefs builds
up to a public reconciliation ceremony that hundreds, and in rare cases even
thousands, might attend. This is why this form of peacebuilding is at the
heart of the highly participative peace accomplished in Bougainville. At the
large final ceremony, both sides express hopes, fears, and regrets. Apologies
53 Patrick Howley (undated) (unpublished document, on file with Peace Foundation
Melanesia).
54 Interview with President Kabui in Bougainville (2006).
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by men are often tearful and are often responded to with wailing displays of
sadness and very often forgiveness by the women who are the closest family
to victims. Christian traditions of prayers of solace and pleas for forgiveness
are normally intertwined with the indigenous traditions of the reconciliation
ritual. Both their indigenous origins and their Christian elements gave this
path to peace special legitimacy in the eyes of Bougainvilleans. The sheer
spread of such local . reconciliations put "pressure on leaders of all
Bougainville factions," including Francis Ona and other potential spoilers,55
not to unsettle the peace.
Dr. Bob Breen, who is finishing the official Australian history of
peacekeeping in Bougainville, and who served as a colonel in Bougainville,
argued in my interview with him in 2009 that the greatest contribution of the
peacekeepers was accelerating reconciliations that would have eventually
occurred naturally. 56 A hard part of starting a reconciliation between groups
who have been killing one another is for someone to risk proposing a
meeting. On Breen's account, this was the most useful thing peacekeepers
did: approaching one group and suggesting a meeting with another to making
peace locally-and offering to attend to provide a third-party security
guarantee for a risky meeting.57
In June 2009, former PNG Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan, who was
brought down by the Sandline mercenaries fiasco,58 supported by the whole
cabinet of his New Ireland Province of which he was Governor, and
traditional culture groups participated in reconciliation ceremonies all day on
June 13, 2009 at which Sir Julius apologized for his role with Sandline. New
reconciliations like this one and the Youth Cross reconciliations that
occurred a decade or more after the initial peace agreement illustrate the
progressive creativity of new waves of reconciliation in Bougainville. For the
more terrible war crimes, it often took a decade or more before perpetrators
were ready to speak of them. Expanding ripples of traditional reconciliation
gradually generated an atmosphere of safety to do so. Reconciliation often
preceded truth in the following sense. After an attack on a village, the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army Company that led the assault might, with
55 For development of the concept of the spoiler in a peace process, see Stephen J.
Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, 22 INT'L SECURITY 5 (1997).
56 Interview with Dr. Bob Breen in Canberra, Australia (2009).
57 Id.
58 O'CALLAGHAN, supra note 52; Desh Gupta, Sandline Episode: Economic Impact
and Implications, 32 J. PAC. HIST. 65 (1997); Tim McCormack, The 'Sandline Affair:'
Papua New Guinea Mercenarism to End the Bougainville Conflict, I Y.B. INT'L
HUMANITARIAN L. 292 (1998).
459
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the support of their home villages, gradually negotiate a collective
reconciliation between their company and the village they attacked. This
would culminate in a reconciliation ceremony attended by hundreds of
people at which the commanders of the company would apologize on behalf
of their unit as a collectivity and would be' forgiven. Only later, after
individuals who murdered or raped specific individuals had attended that
collective reconciliation and realized that the forgiveness was genuine, would
they consider individual reconciliation. When they saw that no members of
their unit were targeted after fronting as a group to confess the atrocities,
culpable individuals found the courage to step forward to ask forgiveness
from the wife or mother of a man they killed, and offer to return his bones to
them. Then, the much more emotional reconciliation of an individual war
criminal retrieving the body from where he buried it, returning the man's
bones to his wailing women, would occur. The truth of individual criminal
culpability would then finally be confessed. The justice that would come
with it would be restorative in form, compensatory justice, usually with the
payment of pigs and other food and traditional shell money, apology and
forgiveness-"Breaking of Spears and Mending of Hearts." 59 The perpetrator
would never face a formal court or go to prison.
Bottom-up, village-by-village reconciliation created momentum for the
top-down political settlement. That settlement then created a pacified space
in which it was safe for local reconciliation to grow across all Bougainville.
This was the virtuous circle between bottom-up reconciliation and top-down
political settlement. The political settlement was innovative in its temporal
sequencing of linked commitments that were made credible by the linkages.
It took the form of, "we will do this when you are certified by the United
Nations to have done that. When we have been certified to have done it, then
and only then do we expect you to solve the next problem." This temporal
sequencing of linked commitments was seen with weapons disposal, power
sharing, and constitutional change. It meant a slow food approach to a peace
now tasted by the people of Bougainville.60
The Bougainville bottom-up reconciliations achieved only fragile
progress when war raged around them. Yet, we also found that early
reconciliations paved the way to a political settlement. So we hypothesize
that the commonly expressed wisdom during our fieldwork in the corridors
of the UN in New York that "peacekeeping cannot work if there is no peace
59 See PATRICK HOWLEY, BREAKING SPEARS AND MINDING HEARTS: PEACEMAKERS
AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN BOUGAINVILLE (2002).
60 See Boege, supra note 21.
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to keep" goes too far. While a political settlement can create peace without
genuine truth and reconciliation, and while truth and reconciliation might be
unlikely to secure peace without a political settlement, truth, justice, and
reconciliation could be more than just value added on top of a settlement.
Rather, my argument is that top-down political settlement and bottom-up
restorative justice form a virtuous circle that so far has consolidated a deeply
sustainable peace in Bougainville.
IV. MOSTLY NON-TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
FIRST IN INDONESIA, WITHOUT JUSTICE
After the fall of President Suharto in 1998, many commentators felt
Indonesia would break up like Yugoslavia because an even larger number of
ethnic and religious wars and independence conflicts flared up from one end
of Indonesia to the other, from Aceh to West Papua.61 The PEACEBUILDING
COMPARED volume Anomie and Violence: Non-Truth and Reconciliation in
Indonesian Peacebuilding considered seven such conflicts that each took
more than a thousand lives-in several cases a great many thousands.62 With
the exception of West Papua, all these conflicts have been settled, and no one
sees Indonesia today as at risk of breaking up.63 At the height of this conflict
in 2002, Indonesia, with the world's largest Muslim population of any
country, 64 had the highest number of terrorist incidents and deaths in the
world.65 These had steeply increased for some years before September 11,
61 See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY GLOBAL INSTABILITY 293 (2003).
Amy Chua was one of many commentators proved premature on breakup when she
opined in the final paragraph of her interesting book on how democracy could unleash
violence against "market-dominant minorities" minorities' (such as the Chinese in
Indonesia) that "the results of democratisation in Indonesia have been disastrous." Id.
62 See JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., ANOMIE AND VIOLENCE: NON-TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION IN INDONESIAN PEACEBUILDING (2010)..
63 For discussion of Indonesian political stability, See Rodd McGibbon, Indonesian
Politics in 2006: Stability, Compromise and Shifting Contests over Ideology, 42 BULL.
INDONESIAN ECON. STUD. 321 (2006).
64 According to the World Health Organization, the population of Indonesia in 2009
was 229,965,000. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Global Health Observatory Data
Repository, http://www.who.int/gho/count ries/idn/en/.
65 See Timo Kimimaki, Can Development and Democratization Address the Root
Causes of Terrorism in Southeast Asia?, 20 PAC. REv. 49, 50 (2007); U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2002 REP.: EAST ASIA OVERVIEW,
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2001. But after 2002, as terrorism steeply increased across most of the
Muslim world, Indonesian terrorism sharply declined.66 Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan overtook Indonesia as the countries with the largest terrorism
problems.
Anomie and Violence argues that bottom-up reconciliation worked quite
well in Indonesia and laid a foundation for formal top-down peace
agreements that mostly stuck.67 In this sense, Indonesia was like
Bougainville. Where it was absolutely different is that reconciliation was not
based on speaking the truth about the conflict that had occurred and nor did
reconciliation lay a foundation for a gradual acknowledgement of truth, at
least not yet, a decade on from these conflicts. The traditional indigenous
reconciliations that we described for the Indonesian conflicts often had many
elements in common with Bougainville reconciliations, such as prayers,
giving of gifts, feasts, dancing, speeches of sorrow and forgiveness, and even
burial of ritual objects to signify a permanent peace that meant any spoiler
would have terrible things befall them. But when we explained to reconciling
parties in Indonesia that in Bougainville reconciliations individuals would
often step forward and confess to burning a particular house, killing a
particular man, or raping a particular woman; we were always told that no
one ever admitted such things in their reconciliations. 68 The situation was
actually worse than simply one of perpetrators being afraid to speak the truth
of their crimes. Often reconciliation was based on lies in which all sides
acquiesced. The most common one was that it was "outside provocateurs"
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20112.pdf. (Note also that these public
databases exclude large numbers of terrorist incidents in Indonesia of which the author is
aware of from his fieldwork, but nevertheless portray accurately the pattern of their rise
and fall.).
66 For further discussion on recent trends of terrorism in Indonesia, see Martin van
Bruinessen, Genealogies of Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia, 10 SOUTHEAST ASIA
RES. 117 (2003); John T. Sidel, It Is Not Getting Worse: Terrorism is Declining in Asia, 2
GLOBAL ASIA 41 (2003); JOHN T. SIDEL, RIOTS POGROMS, JIHAD: RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN
INDONESIA (2006); Sidney Jones, Briefing for the New President: The Terrorist Threat in
Indonesia and Southeast Asia, 618 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 69 (2008).
67 BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 62.
68 This may reflect Hayner's point that, "There are some countries, although few,
which emerge from civil war or other period of intense violence with no interest in
investigating the details of recent events." Priscilla J. Hayner, International Guidelines
for the Creation and Operation of Truth Commissions: A Preliminary Proposal, 59 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 176 (2005). Hayner points to the example of Mozambique,
arguing that in some cases a policy of reconciled silence may be appropriate. Id.
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who started the violence, when in fact it was locals who both started and
finished the killing on both sides. In most of these conflicts, there were few
or no prosecutions for the violence. Where there were prosecutions, there
was often a feeling that scapegoats were prosecuted, and the political
masterminds of the violence went free69-a feeling that frequently seemed to
have some merit.
In that book, we argued that while truth and reconciliation is better than
non-truth and reconciliation, reconciliation is better than no reconciliation. 70
Moreover, reconciliation in Indonesia seemed to have succeeded in helping
settle a permanent peace in all conflicts except West Papua. So, how was
reconciliation accomplished? One widespread modality of healing was
gotong royong, a core tenet of Indonesian philosophy meaning "mutual aid"
or "joint bearing of burdens."71 The military, whose actions in fueling
conflict and inactions in preventing it caused resentment on both sides in all
the Indonesian conflicts, participated widely in gotong royong by rebuilding
houses that had been lost to victims on both sides.
Sometimes, the ethnic or religious group that ended with control of a
village would invite back only a small number of trusted families of the
ethnic other as a first step toward rebuilding trust. Much of the discussion at
these reintegration meetings was with government officials and humanitarian
agencies, who attended to offer practical assistance with resettling people
into their old villages. A common gesture of practical reconciliation was for a
Christian community to start rebuilding a mosque they had burned down, or a
Muslim community to start rebuilding a church they had razed. The cleansed
group might be invited back to the village to see this for themselves as a sign
of the sincerity of the desire for reconciliation and to give advice on how to
do the rebuilding. Then they might do some work together on the project.
When they returned, their former enemies often organized a moving
welcome ceremony for them. They were showered with gifts of food and
other necessities from a steady stream of visits to their home by former
enemies who, before the conflict, had also been friends and neighbors. The
point of this summary narrative is not to say this always happened. There
was also bitterness, unpleasant exchanges, and people who were shunned.
69 The most dramatic illustration of this feeling of the political masterminds going
free while a few were targeted (indeed executed) was the Central Sulawesi conflict.
BRArHWAITE ET AL., supra note 62, at 273.
70 Id. at 44.
71 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 211 (Basic 1983); John R. Bowen, On the Political Construction of
Tradition: Gotong Royong in Indonesia, 45 J. ASIAN STuD. 545 (1986).
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The point of our narrative research is to give a sense of how reconciliation
without truth worked when it did work-which was quite a lot. When a
mosque built substantially by Christian hands was opened, the Christian
community would be invited, and sometimes Christian prayers would be said
inside the mosque.
We also found rituals of everyday life to be important to reconciliation.
Christians attending the funeral of a respected Muslim leader, and embracing
Muslims soon after the conflict, were of reconciliation. So were Christians
being invited to the celebration of Muhammad's birthday, Muslims to
Christmas celebrations, and halal bi halal. Halal bi halal is an Indonesian
ritual at the end of Ramadan where neighbors go to one another's homes to
ask forgiveness for any wrong they might have done in the past year (without
mentioning any specific wrongs). 72 The modernist Indonesian press often
criticizes halal bi halal as a shallow and insincere ritual where neighbors
who cannot stand each other nevertheless seek this generic forgiveness. Yet,
in villages where people had been slaughtering one another, we were
repeatedly told of halal bi halal having deep meaning. Forgiveness was
requested by a looter or a killer, and although nothing was spoken of the
looting or killing, as the two neighbors wept together in a long hug, both
knew exactly the crimes over which they were shedding their tears. In our
interviews, we were told of simple acts of kindness that were important for
building bottom-up reconciliation: a Muslim religious leader who picks up an
old Christian man in his car and drops him at the market or the loan of a
Muslim lawnmower to cut the grass of the Christian church. Peace zones
where peace markets could operate to reopen old trading relationships were
central to the trust-building of the Baku Bae reconciliation movement in
Ambon.73 All these were included among the great variety of locally creative
and meaningful ways that people reconciled without ever speaking the truth
to one another about who was responsible for crimes.
V. MOSTLY TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN TIMOR-LESTE
FOLLOWED BY LITTLE JUSTICE
Timor-Leste was invaded by Indonesia in 1975 and became a site of a
civil war that cost more than 100,000 lives.74 The same post-Suharto anomie
72 BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 62, at 177.
73 Id. at 171, 187.
74 See JOHN G. TAYLOR, INDONESIA'S FORGOTTEN WAR: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
EAST TIMOR (Zen 1991); JAMES DUNN, EAST TIMOR: A ROUGH PASSAGE TO
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discussed in the last section led to a vote for independence in 1999.75 This
concession by the new democratic government was so resented by the
Indonesian military that they burned three quarters of the buildings in Timor-
Leste to the ground and killed all the independence supporters they could
find.76 Timor-Leste differed from Indonesia after 1999 in that it put in place
a TRC that did an extraordinarily thorough job of documenting the truth of
what happened during the nation's civil wars.77 That truth was widely
disseminated, across the globe, but not initially in Indonesia. More recently,
however, its report has been published in Indonesian and disseminated there.
There has also now been a much less thorough Truth and Friendship
Commission with five Indonesian and five Timor-Leste Commissioners. 78
This was the first bilateral TRC the world has seen. 79 In spite of profound
procedural limitations, the forthcoming PEACEBUILDING COMPARED book on
Timor-Leste concludes that this commission has at least begun Indonesia's
INDEPENDENCE (Longueville Media 2003); ANDREA K. MOLNAR, TIMOR-LEsTE:
POLITICS, HISTORY, AND CULTURE (2010); Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual
Responsibility and National Reconciliation: The UN Truth Commission for East Timor,
95 AM. J. INT'LLAW 952 (2001); Brad Simpson, "Illegally and Beautifully:" The United
States, the Indonesian Invasion ofEast Timor and the International Community 1974-76,
5 COLD WAR HIST. 281 (2005); Nicholas J. Wheeler & Tim Dunne, East Timor and the
New Humanitarian Interventionism, 77 INT'L AFF. 805 (2001).
75 The East Timorese went to the polls on August 30, 1999 leading to an
"overwhelming victory of the pro-independence movement" in the referendum. Wheeler
& Dunne, supra note 74, at 805. However, when the results were announced on
September 4, 1999, violence erupted. Stefanie Frease, Playing Hide and Seek with
International Justice: What Went Wrong in Indonesia and East Timor, 10 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 283, 285 (2004).
76 See DUNN, supra note 74; DAMIEN KINGSBURY, EAST TIMOR: THE PRICE OF
LIBERTY (2009); Anthony L. Smith, East Timor: Elections in the World's Newest Nation,
15 J. DEMOCRACY 145 (2004).
7 See generally Chega! The Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth
and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste (CA VR) (2005), available at http://cavr-
timorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm (providing a detailed description of the tumultuous
events occurring in Timor-Leste, and 1999, when the people of Timor-Leste declared
independence from Indonesia).
78 Final Report of Commission of Truth and Friendship Indonesia-Timor-Leste
(2008).
79 Leigh Ashley Lipscomb, Beyond the Truth: Can Reparations Move Peace and
Justice Forward in Timor-Leste?, 93 ASIA PAC. ISSUES 4 (2010).
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journey toward the truth of acknowledging the atrocities perpetrated by its
military in Timor-Leste.80
In Indonesia, where most of the war criminals fled, there has been almost
no justice directed at the perpetrators of war crimes.81 Inside Timor-Leste,
eighty-four mostly lower-level Timorese members of militias, recruited to do
much of the Indonesian military's dirty work, were convicted in the courts.82
Theoretically for less serious war crimes, but in practice often for serious
crimes like burning down villages and even murder, 83 Timor's TRC put in
place a Community Reconciliation Process that most commentators regard as
a greater success than the selective criminal prosecutions of small fry, while
culpable generals went free. 84 Unlike so many of the internationally funded
programs of the early 2000s, employees of Timor-Leste's TRC were 80%
local and Commissioners were 100% local. Regional staff from each district
ran the Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) in their district. While we
will see that the CRP was a perpetrator-centered process that could have
done much more to give voice to female victims,85 at least in requiring by
regulation that 30% of the regional commissioners who chaired the hearings
80 JOHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., NETWORKED GOVERNANCE OF FREEDOM AND
TYRANNY: WAR AND PEACE IN EAST TIMOR (forthcoming 2012).
81 Frease, supra note 75, at 287-88. Indeed, the legal proceedings that have occurred
are said to have: "produced a distorted legal record of events. The official court record
portrays the violence in East Timor as a purely East Timorese conflict in which Indonesia
benevolently intervened to separate two fighting parties." Frease, supra note 75, at 288.
82 Caitlin Reiger & Marieke Wierda, The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In
Retrospect, INT'L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. PROSECUTIONS CASE STUD. (2006).
83 In the oral and audio-visual presentation of this Schwartz Lecture, a passage was
shown from the documentary, PASSABE, of a TRC Community Reconciliation Process
meeting in which a man confessed to participation in burning down the village in which it
was held, to assaulting some individuals and killing one with his machete--one of
seventy-four who were rounded up and murdered. See PASSABE (Lianain Films 2005).
The documentary is about how survivors in the village did not want him to be prosecuted
because all the others involved in the massacre said, "[Y]es they were there, but by the
time they arrived the burning and killing was over" or some such exculpation, while he
was the one to speak the truth of the atrocity and confess his involvement in it.
84 For a discussion on imported and indigenous judicial methods in East Timor, see
Tanja Hohe, Justice Without Judiciary in East Timor, 3 CONFLICT SECURITY & DEV. 335
(2003).
85 Susan Harris Rimmer, Transitional Justice and East Timorese Women (2008)
(published Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University) (on file with Menzies
Library, Australian National University), available at
http://cigj.anu.edu.au/cigj/link-documents/Publications/SusanThesisl.pdf.
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were women, front-stage empowerment of women was higher than among
officers of the formal justice system. There were even some cases where all
the members of panels (usually with three to five members) were women.
Regional Commissioners negotiated with local elders the appropriate
way of ritualizing nahe biti bo'ot ("stretching the big mat" on which
deponents 86 perpetrators, victims, and elders would sit) for that locality;87
though adat (lisan) leaders had a reduced role from their traditional role of
judge and jury, deferring to the mediation role of a panel of prominent
community members and a chair from the TRC staff from that district.88 Pre-
negotiations before the ceremony often lasted three months. Usually, the
ceremony itself ran for one day during which more than one deponent would
be heard. There was usually chewing of betel-nut, drinking of wine or blood
or both mixed together, cooling conflict by sprinkling coconut water,
sacrifice of animals, and reintegrative feasting.89 A storyteller or lian nain
would mediate between victims and perpetrators in pursuit of an agreement,
and the restoration of balance between the spiritual and secular world that
had been disturbed by the wrongdoing.90 There was great variation from
place-to-place in how large the latter spiritual balance issues loomed. A
reconciliatory prayer by a Catholic priest in the local language usually
opened proceedings. Part of the genius of the CRP resided in mobilizing a
ritually serious engagement of truth and reconciliation by drawing upon the
legitimacy of state justice-through reading a letter from the General
Prosecutor authorizing the hearing--of lisan through ritual calling upon
86 The use of the term "deponents" rather than perpetrators was intended to
communicate that it would often be the case that people who burned houses did so under
fear of violence from the Indonesian military, so it would be possible for all present at the
CRP--deponent, victims, community members-to share an identity as survivors of the
occupation. On this point, see Ben Larke, ". . .And the Truth Shall Set You Free: "
Confessional Trade-Offs and Community Reconciliation in East Timor, 37 ASIAN J. OF
Soc. Sci., 646, 660 (2009).
87 Sandra Scheeringa, Enhancing the Local Legitimacy of Transitional Justice
Institutions: Local Embeddedness and Customary Law in CA VR, in EAST TIMOR:
BEYOND INDEPENDENCE 129, 136 (Damien Kingsbury & Michael Leach eds., 2007).
88 Larke, supra note 86, at 658.
89 Dionisio Babo-Soares, Nahe Biti: The Philosophy and Process of Grassroots
Reconciliation (and Justice) in East Timor, 5 ASIA PAC. J. ANTH. 15, 20 (2004);
STANLEY, supra note 1, at 114.
90 The lian nain "know the history and are in contact with the ancestors. They come
from specific families that are the 'owner of the words."' Hohe, supra note 84, at 343.
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deceased ancestors to join the proceeding and enforce its conclusions, 91 and
of the legitimacy of the church through the priest's prayer.
Where agreement on a peaceful way forward was not reached, cases
would be referred to the police. Where it was reached, the Community
Reconciliation Agreement would be read out and signed by panel members
and by deponents, who would apologize to the community. Once perpetrators
of crimes had been welcomed back into the community at the end of the
process, they could no longer be prosecuted for them.
The opening remarks by the Chair of the local CRP Panel (in common
with the closing agreement) would usually include a renunciation of the use
of violence to achieve political ends. Then the perpetrator/deponent would
read a statement he or she had voluntarily prepared in advance with
assistance from CRP staff. Questions were then asked, including from
victims, who were also invited to make statements of the impact of crimes on
them. Reparations and other measures would then be agreed and registered
with the Dili District Court. 92 The final stage of the process usually involved
some kind of ritualized readmission of the war criminal to the community.
While only 20% of those indicted by the Serious Crimes process were
processed through to a trial, and these were systematically less serious
indictments, 90% of deponents who requested that they be called to account
under the community reconciliation process, 1,371 individuals, saw the
ordeal through to completed community reconciliation hearings. 93 The
incomplete cases were either adjourned and then dropped, or cases where the
deponent did not attend. If the CRP was a less severely punitive justice than
that of Serious Crimes Panel cases, it at least consistently delivered the kind
ofjustice it provided once a case got underway.
There was nevertheless a problem, in the words of Zifcak, of the CRP
becoming a "victim of its own success" 94 after 30,000, perhaps 40,000,
people had attended its hearings. His rough estimate is that there were
another 3,000 deponents interested in coming forward to make admissions
and seek reconciliation after the CRP shut down.95 There were also cases
where the CRP visited local towns but not more remote villages where
91 Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, supra note 77, at Part 9, 24.
92 Spencer Zifcak, Restorative Justice in Timor-Leste: The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 68 DEV. BULL. 51, 52-53 (2005)
93 Scheeringa, supra note 87, at 138.
94 Zifcak, supra note 92, at 53.
95 Id. at 51.
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people were waiting and expecting them to come. 96 In the Timor book for
PEACEBUILDING COMPARED, various other qualifications upon the broad
assessment of the success of the CRP are discussed. 97 But it is Zifcak's
concern that it was a victim of its own success that is of principal policy
relevance to our analysis of time and TRCs in this lecture. Because the Timor
TRC was given an operational life of only three years, just as demand was
building for its community reconciliation work, it was cut off.
VI. MOSTLY PUNITIVE JUSTICE FIRST IN SOLOMON ISLANDS
The Solomon Islands violence of 1998-2003 is often described as an
ethnic conflict and a land conflict on Guadalcanal between armed gangs from
Guadalcanal and from the neighboring island of Malaita.9 8 As we describe in
our PEACEBUILDING COMPARED volume on that conflict, it was a more
complex conflict than that.99 What distinguishes peacebuilding in the
Solomon Islands is that the international peacekeeping operation led by
Australia adopted a much more systematically prosecutorial approach than in
any other peace operation we know. Some 6,300 Solomon Islanders were
arrested, many on multiple charges, in the first three years of the Regional
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). 00 Some RAMSI officers
John Braithwaite interviewed saw it as a de facto policy in the early years of
the intervention to charge leading militants with something reasonably
plausible to get them locked up on remand, while they more carefully sought
to build evidence against them. When Australian Prime Minister Howard
announced the intervention, he referred to the risk of the Solomons becoming
a "safe haven for transnational criminals and even terrorists."101 The
formidably Christian Solomons in truth seemed an inhospitable safe haven
for transnational terrorists. Many who supported the intervention as a good
thing for the people of the Solomon Islands went along with a story that also
allowed Howard to impress members of the Bush Administration-for
96 Stanley, supra note 1, at 116.
97 BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 80.
98 Shahar Hameiri, The Trouble with RAMSL Reexamining the Roots of Conflict in
the Solomon Islands, 19 CONTEMP. PAC. 409, 410 (2007). Tarcisius T. Kabutaulaka,
Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention in Solomon Islands, 17 CONTEMP.
PAC. 283, 284 (2005).
99 JoHN BRAITHWAITE ET AL., supra note 4, at 1-4.
100 As further evidence of the scale of arrests, there were 773 arrests in a six month
period in 2003 alone. Kabutaulaka, supra note 98, at 297.
101 John Howard, AusTL. PARL. DEB., H.R. (Aug. 12, 2003) (ministerial statement).
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example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice-with how he was cleaning
up his regional bad lands. 102
The leadership of RAMSI for many years declined to support civil
society and church agitation for a TRC, and supported the disestablishment
of the National Peace Council that was doing productive reconciliation work
when the peacekeepers landed. By 2009, however, the Solomon Islands
Government was no longer willing to resist community demand for a TRC
and legislated for one-but with a life of one year, extendable to two.
Limited donor funds then did arrive to support the TRC, which was launched
by Desmond Tutu in late 2009.
The first thing that was fascinating about the criminal justice first
approach in the Solomon Islands (without donor support for truth and
reconciliation) is that combatants in the prisons started their own
reconciliation program. The prisoners called in the Sycamore Tree Program,
sponsored by the churches and Prison Fellowship International, to help them
do it. This reconciliation work had little donor support. Much of the funding
came from former militants, who participated in the program while inside
and supported it from outside after they served their sentences.
Leaders of the church and prison staff told us that the most prominent
Malaita Eagle Force leader, Jimmy Rasta, had provided formidable funding
to transport families (by boat from Malaita, for example) to join
reconciliations inside the prison and for other needs of the program. Rasta's
wife, Vika Koto, we were told, always cooked and brought the food for the
reconciliations. She had served two years in prison herself on remand
awaiting a murder trial in which she was acquitted. We were struck that in
our conversations with the Rasta family, they did not mention this generosity.
It was others, including their former enemies, who reported their generosity.
Rasta did, however, tell us that all forty-three employees in his brick-making,
plant hire, and roadwork business were ex-combatants. He claimed the
business existed for the purpose of serving their reintegration, rather than his
accumulation of wealth. Rasta won a landslide victory to enter Parliament in
2010, and became a minister in the new government. Then, in late 2010,
Rasta was charged with another crime from the year 2000 and went back into
prison.
102 Australia under Howard has been said to have been "declared America's 'deputy
sheriff in the Pacific region." Clive Moore, Australia's Motivation and Timing for 2003
Intervention in the Solomon Islands Crisis, 19 ROYAL HIST. Soc. QUEENSLAND J. 732,
740 (2005).
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Most of the key militant leaders from the two sides, even though RAMSI
originally segregated them in prison, experienced reconciliations inside the
prison. When we interviewed them both inside and outside the prison, these
reconciliations seemed deeply meaningful to them. Prison staff reported
amazement at observing the ex-combatants living together in a small prison
for years, and never observing unpleasant interactions, let alone violence,
between those who had been killing each other during the conflict (except in
respect of two militant leaders, who in one case was mentally disturbed and
traumatized and in the other had taken a bullet in his brain).
Since the conflict ended, the number of arrests and incarcerations per
capita, more so per conflict death, exceeds that in any case of post-conflict
justice the authors know. The big question for Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions in other nations has been: Which will be the cases for which
the truth established will be used to launch prosecutions, and where will
amnesty be allowed? The Solomons already has an amnesty law, albeit one
whose spirit-as articulated in speeches in the Parliament that enacted it-
has hardly been honored. In a context in which most of the post-conflict
justice work is done, the key policy question is no longer: "How willing are
we to trade away justice to get to the truth and to reconciliation?" More of
the emphasis can be on the nation-building opportunity that a sad truth about
the past and reconciliation for the future can deliver in a post-conflict
environment. South Africa is the best-known example of seizing that nation-
building opportunity thanks to the grace of leaders such as Nelson Mandela
and Desmond Tutu, who were able to rewrite the national story of South
Africa as a coming together of peoples-black, white and coloured-who
were all victims of an institution called apartheid. Abraham Lincoln had
likewise been able to re-narrate what it meant to be an American 160 years
ago at the end of his Civil War: black or white, North or South, to be an
American was to be a victim of slavery as an institution-an American is a
person who is part of a national struggle to transcend the terrible legacy of
slavery. 103
The truth and reconciliation process in Solomon Islands provides an
opportunity for citizens to tell their stories and to hear those of others, to
discover what it means to be a Solomon Islander. The process of storytelling
began with the first hearings in March 2010 "featuring a procession of
children from all over the islands" and an opening by the chair "stating that
103 See Robert Meister, Forgiving and Forgetting: Lincoln and the Politics of
National Recovery, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO
BOSNIA (Carla Hesse and Robert Post eds., 1999).
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the hearings would disperse shame, but also that the perpetrators would have
a chance to regain their humanity." 04
Jimmy Rasta says he wants a "Forgiveness Bill." Alex Bartlett wants a
"Pardon Bill." The Sikua government's National Policy Statement included
to "[t]able a Pardon/Forgiveness Bill in Parliament for enactment."105 Upon
his election in August 2010, the incoming Prime Minister Danny Philip
announced he would introduce a Forgiveness Bill to cover all ex-militants. It
is an option for the Solomon Islands Government to apologize to militants
through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for failing to honor the
spirit of the amnesty agreement it signed in Townsville in 2000, to commit to
an end to all new criminal trials arising from the conflict, and for the
Governor-General to pardon all of those currently in prison who are
rehabilitated and stand ready to apologise for their wrongdoing. A Truth and
Reconciliation Commission report recommendation for a Forgiveness Bill
would doubtless not be passed by the Parliament before 2013. By then, the
ex-combatants remaining in prison would have been there a long time.
Almost all have been model prisoners. Most had no prior criminal record
of any kind, and come from loving families that stand ready to support them
on release. From inside prison, they have shown leadership to the rest of the
nation in how to bring the killers from the two sides together in
reconciliation. The TRC could acknowledge this leadership. Most of these
ex-combatants are profoundly committed to non-violence as a result of their
reconciliation experience with Sycamore Tree-most are respected, energetic
leaders from communities that need more hard-working leadership.
The main prison in Solomon Islands is overcrowded, so there is a case
that the nation would be well-served by emptying out combatants who have
paid their dues when so many other killers and masterminds of violence have
gone free and when many more serious criminals than those locked up were
released in return for testifying against those on the RAMSI target list. Of
course, the argument against Rasta's "Forgiveness Bill" is that it would do
injustice and compromise the rule of law. But it also does violence to the rule
of law to offer immunity to more serious criminals who testify against less
104 Susan Harris Rimmer, Building Democracy After Conflict: Working Paper No. 4,
The Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation Commission 6 (Austl. Nat'1 Univ. Ctr. For
Int'l Governance & Just., Working Paper No. 4, 2010).
105 NAT'L PARL. SOLOMON ISLANDS FOREIGN REL. COMM. REP., INQUIRY INTO THE
FACILITATION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE NOTICE 2003 AND RAMSI INTERVENTION
(Nov. 2009), available at http://www
.parliament.gov.sb/files/committees/foreignrelations/FRC%20Final%2ORe port.pdf.
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serious ones because the latter happened to hold an office in the command
structure of a militant group. It also does violence to the rule of law to turn a
blind eye to the corruption of multinational logging companies and the
ministers they paid as root causes of the conflict. It does violence to the rule
of law to fail to prosecute RAMSI officers' who offered financial
inducements to witnesses to testify against those on their target list. If it is an
acceptable deviation from the rule of law to legislate for these RAMSI
officers to enjoy immunity from prosecution in respect of any crimes they
commit in responding to the conflict,' 0 6 why is it unacceptable to grant such
immunity to former militants? A counter to the rule-of-law objection to a
Rasta Forgiveness Bill is therefore that there was selective injustice in who
served time in prison.
In the near future we will discover what paths to future truth, justice, and
reconciliation the Solomon Islands' TRC and government chooses. Whatever
it does choose, the Solomons case already suggests how little path
dependency there is in the choice peace operations and governments make on
the sequencing of justice, truth, and reconciliation. It shows how civil society
actors and villagers can make their own choices to follow the paths not taken
by the state and the internationals. It shows that it is never too late to retrieve
restorative justice from punitive justice, reconciliation over a criminal
injustice system (indeed from within its bowels), truth and memory from a
history of lies and forgetting.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a great deal every nation can learn from the peace in
Bougainville about the way top-down, sequenced architectures of formal
peace agreements and bottom-up, local reconciliation can be mutually
reinforcing. The bottom-up reconciliation started first and enjoyed local
success first. It established "islands of civility" 0 7 from which a wider peace
process could begin and spread-something we also saw in Ambon,
Indonesia and other cases. More important still was the lesson that the people
of Bougainville continue to express today-the view that most of the
reconciliation remains to be done. From the outsider's point of view,
Bougainville has done far more reconciliations, involving more people from
the top to the grassroots, than any other case we have studied. It is the
106 Shahar Hameiri, Governing Disorder: The Australian Federal Police and
Australia's New Regional Frontier 22 PAC. REv. 549, 566 (2009).
107 Kaldor, supra note 35.
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attitude that reconciliation is always unfinished work-that there is still
much violence that is unconfessed, in need of apology-and traditional
compensation, that most focuses us on the theme of this essay.
Solomon Islands is a radically different story of an exceptionally
prosecutorial approach where, as in Iraq, international forces produced a long
list of militant commanders they set about arresting and trying one by one.
Yet, an approach that meets the definition of restorative justice, with some
help from western restorative justice NGOs, but that was actually a mixture
of Christian and pre-Christian approaches to traditional village reconciliation,
became as important within the prisons of Solomon Islands as it was in the
villages of Bougainville. From Solomon Islands to Bougainville to Timor to
North Maluku, traditional reconciliations that had restorative justice
characteristics actually had greater peacemaking power than western
restorative justice because of spiritual beliefs (Animist, Christian, or both)
that those who broke an oath to keep the peace would suffer terrible
misfortune. In all these places, oaths to keep the peace overwhelmingly were
honored after they were made in the customary fashion; even when up to that
time, the young fighters who made them had morphed into organized
criminal gangs. The big picture is one of bottom-up indigenous justice
traditions with a restorative quality finding a space even in the face of
conscious top-down policies for punitive justice.
Hence, one conclusion is that whatever happens first-truth, justice or
reconciliation-there is always a creative way of making space for the other
two, even if that space is confined within prison walls. Our finding of non-
truth, yet reconciliation, in Indonesia makes an interesting case-in-point.
Simply because reconciliation in Indonesian conflicts helped create peace
without truth, future high-integrity truth-seeking in Indonesia is not ruled out
when people feel safe enough to face it. The unique institution of a bilateral
Truth and Friendship Commission between Indonesia and Timor-Leste,
flawed as it was, took some preliminary steps in Jakarta toward confronting
truths about atrocity in Timor-Leste that had previously been suppressed.
Susanne Karstedt's research shows that in the 1940s and '50s reconciliation
in Europe was based on the German people believing the lie that atrocities
were only the responsibility of a small inner circle around Hitler. 08 This lie,
that was part of the legacy of Nuremburg, was corrected after later war
108 Susanne Karstedt, The Nuremberg Tribunal and German Society: International
Justice and Local Judgment in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, in THE LEGACY OF
NUREMBERG: CIVILISING INFLUENCE OR INSTITUTIONALISED VENGEANCE 12,28 (David A.
Blumenthal & Timothy L. H. McCormack eds., 2008).
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crimes trials from the 1960s gave direct voice to the victims of concentration
camps for the first time.
While the Indonesia-Timor Truth and Friendship Commission shows
absolutely no sign of laying a foundation for future justice in Indonesia's
courts for its criminal generals, nor should we rule that possibility out
completely. Keeping a flickering flame of reconciliation conversation going
might be the basis for a new philosophy of permanent Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions comforting survivors with a societal
commitment to never give up on truth, memory, and justice as a project for
the "longue dur6e."l 09 The Bougainville experience of enduring
reconciliation shows that most of the perpetrators and survivors of the worst
atrocities are not ready for meaningful reconciliation in the first few years
after the peace. They are not emotionally ready. More than that, after a civil
war, people are so busy with rebuilding their homes, their churches, their
schools, and re-planting decimated fields.
A permanent TRC that keeps its doors open for a century has the option
of educating survivors that truth, justice, and reconciliation are partial
accomplishments of the longue dur6e. They can never be quick and easy is
the educational message. The other message is that, whenever survivors are
ready, they can walk through the TRC's doors to record their story, to request
that perpetrators step forward for reconciliation or justice, or both. The ethos
of the educative appeals to victims of a permanent commission is that
survivors can put their trust in their children and grandchildren to preserve
the memory of their suffering and never close the door on truth, justice, and
reconciliation. This is part of why using the archives and artifacts of a
permanent TRC for a museum is important. It becomes a focus for educating
future generations of schoolchildren in the sacrifices of their forebears. 10
Particularly in poor countries where capital city tourist attractions tend to be
few, museums that commemorate recent wars often become major drawcards
that can charge tourists admission fees that offset costs.1 11 International
109 Id.
110 This would be in addition to the potential educative effects that time-limited
truth commissions already possess. Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious
Human Rights Abuses: Of Prosecution and Truth Commissions, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 81, 88 (1996). For a discussion of the importance of history education in
transitional justice more generally, see Elizabeth A. Cole, Transitional Justice and the
Reform ofHistory Education, 1 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 115 (2007).
Ill Often referred to as "dark tourism," a fascinating literature exists on this
emerging field. See generally JOHN T. LENNON & MALCOLM FOLEY, DARK ToURIsM: THE
ATTRACTION OF DEATH AND DISASTER (Continuum 2000); Paul Williams, Witnessing
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peacekeepers and their families are often particularly interested later in their
lives to visit such war museums in the countries where they served. A
permanent commission might also educate perpetrators who crave immediate
forgiveness and closure that part of the suffering that it is their responsibility
to bear is patience until their victims are ready for reconciliation, if ever.
Genocide: Vigilance and Remembrance at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, 18 HOLOCAUST
& GENOCIDE STuD. 234 (2004); Senija Causevic & and Paul Lynch, Phoenix Tourism:
Post-Conflict Tourism Role, 38 ANNALS TOURISM REs. 780 (2011); Philip Stone, A Dark
Tourism Spectrum: Towards a Typology of Death and Macabre Tourism Sites,
Attractions and Museums, 54 TOURIsM: INTERDISC. INT'L J. 145 (2006); THE DARKER
SIDE OF TRAVEL: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DARK TOURISM (Philip Stone & Richard
Sharpley eds., 2009); Philip Stone & Richard Sharpley, Consuming Dark Tourism: A
Thanatological Perspective, 35 ANNALS TOURISM RES. 574 (2008).
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